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NO EXCEPTION FOR "NO": REJECTION OF
THE EXCULPATORY NO DOCTRINE
Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Brogan v. United States,1 the Supreme Court held that
there was no exception to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. §
1001 for a false statement that constituted a mere denial of
guilt. Seven circuits had recognized the exception, termed the
"exculpatory no" doctrine.2 James Brogan was convicted in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York for making
a false statement to federal agents in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1001. 3 When asked about whether he had accepted bribes from
an employer, Brogan falsely responded with a simple "no. 4 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed Brogan's con-
viction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, joining the Fifth Circuit in re-
jecting the "exculpatory no" doctrine.5 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari 6 to resolve the split among the circuits regard-
ing the validity of the doctrine.
This Note argues that although the Court properly con-
cluded that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 admits no
exception for an "exculpatory no," the Court ignored serious
policy concerns regarding the adequacy of controls on prosecu-
torial abuse. This Note then discusses how the holding in Bro-
gan is consistent with the textualist movement on the Court, led
by Justice Antonin Scalia. The Court's rejection of the judicially
'118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
2See infra Part l.C.
' Brogan, 118 S. CL at 808.
4 Id at 807-08.
'United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 37-38, 40 (2d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom Bro-
gan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998); see United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14
F.d 1040, 1041 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
'Brogan v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
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crafted "exculpatory no" doctrine was predictable in light of the
Court's increased emphasis on statutory "plain meaning." How-
ever, this Note argues that Brogan may not be a significant vic-
tory for texualists, since the Court was not asked to ignore
compelling legislative history. Finally, this Note concludes that




Federal law makes it a felony to "knowingly and willfully...
[make] any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or repre-
sentations" in "any matter within the jurisdiction of any depart-
ment or agency of the United States.0 In other words, § 1001
prohibits lying to the federal government.8 The statute crimi-
nalizes a sweeping range of deceptive behavior, including lying
on government forms as well as lying directly to federal agents.9
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). The full text of the statute reads:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements
or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. As amended by the False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
292, § 2, 110 Stat. 3459, the relevant part of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 now reads:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully -
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representa-
tion; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001.
8 Terri L. Combs & Ahna M. Thoresen, Lying to the SEC: The Basics of the False State-
ments Statute SC73 A.L.I.-A.BA. 89, 92 (1998).
9 Id at 93.
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The phrase "knowingly and willfully" only requires that the
statement or misrepresentation be deliberately made with
knowledge that it is untrue.'Y It is not necessary that the speaker
know that it is illegal to make the false statement." Moreover,
the phrase "any matter within the jurisdiction of any depart-
ment or agency of the United States" confers jurisdiction on all
three branches of government.12  Therefore, jurisdiction exists
as long as the matter relates to the authorized function of a gov-
emnment entity.1
Congress enacted the statutory progenitor 4 of § 1001 in
1863 "in the wake of a spate of frauds upon the Government." 5
The original act bears little resemblance to the current statute. 6
For example, the false statement provision in the 1863 Act pro-
hibited only those false statements that were related to the filing
'o Id. at94.
" Id at 94-95. However, under the current statute, a false statement must also be
"material." Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 815-16 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see supra
note 7. To be "material," a false statement "must have a natural tendency to influ-
ence or be capable of influencing a decision of the government body to which it was
addressed." Combs & Thoresen, supra note 8, at 94 (citing United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)).
" Combs & Thoresen, supra note 8, at 95. In 1995, the Court overruled long-
standing precedent that "any agency or department of the United States" covered all
three branches of government. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995)
(overruling United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955)). However, Congress
promptly responded by amending § 1001 to again reach "the jurisdiction of the ex-
ecutive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States." See
supra note 7. See also infra Part V.C.
"Combs & Thoresen, supra note 8, at 95.
Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
"Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 504.
6 Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 705. The statutory progenitor of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 made it a
criminal offense for any person to:
make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented for payment or ap-
proval to or by any person or officer in the civil or military service of the United
States, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States, or any de-
partment or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent
Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. The original enactment also prohibited false
statements, but only those statements made "for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding
in obtaining the approval or payment of [a false] claim .... Id.
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of fraudulent claims against the government."7 This original
provision remained "essentially unchanged for 55 years."'18
Then, in 1918, Congress amended the statute "to cover other
false statements made 'for the purpose and with the intent of
cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the
United States."' 9 History suggests that the purpose of the 1918
amendment was to protect the new government corporations
that emerged during World War 1.20 Despite the amendment's
somewhat broader language, the Supreme Court, in United States
v. Cohn, held that the statute was still limited to "cheating the
Government out of property or money.,
21
The Court's interpretation of the statute in Cohn "became a
serious problem with the advent of the New Deal programs in
the 1930s.,,22 The government realized that its political interests
could be undercut even if it did not lose any property or
money.23 For example, the government sought to limit petro-
leum use by restricting the amount shipped in interstate com-
merce.24 However, some petroleum producers began falsely
reporting the amount produced and shipped from certain oil
wells.25 Even though the Government was not losing money as a
result of the false reports,26 the petroleum producers effectively
undercut the government's interest in reducing the consump-
tion of oil. In order to regain control, Congress responded with
17 Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 813 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citing Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696); see Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 705.
'a Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 705.
'9 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 813 (GinsburgJ., concurring) (quoting Act of Oct. 23, 1918,
ch. 194, § 35, 40 Stat. 1015-16).
20 Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 706. Government corporations are "created and partici-
pated in by the United States for the achievement of governmental objectives." Le-
bron v. Nat'l RR. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 386 (1995). The "first large-scale
use of Government-controlled corporations came with the First World War," when
Congress created the United States Grain Corporation, the United States Emergency
Fleet Corporation, and the United States Spruce Production. Id. at 388.
2 270 U.S. 339, 346 (1926).
2United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 80 (1984).
2Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 814 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
24 United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 90 (1941).
2Id. at 89.
2See Sandra L. Turner, Would I Lie To You? The Sixth Circuit Joins the "Exculpatory
No" Controversy in United States v. Steele, 81 KY. LJ. 213, 217 n.38 (1992-1993).
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a dramatic amendment to the statute in 1934Y It amended the
statute to prohibit the making of "any false or fraudulent state-
ments or representations... in any matter within the jurisdic-
tion of any department or agency of the United States or of any
corporation in which the United States of America is a stock-
holder .... 28 The relevant part of this statute remains substan-
tially the same today.2
B. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Some courts found that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1001
came "uncomfortably close" to infringing upon Fifth Amend-
ment rights. 0 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ... ."31 This clause
embodies the privilege against self-incrimination. 2 The Court
has held that the privilege "protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the
State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature."3
Thus, the privilege is limited in nature because while an accused
may refuse to testify at trial, he may not withhold "real or physi-
cal evidence. " 34
On the other hand, the privilege is not strictly limited to re-
fusing to take the stand at trial. It may extend to analogous
situations where the State has compelled a guilty suspect to talk
27 Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 706-07 (1995) ("The differences between
the 1934 Act and its predecessors are too dramatic to evidence a congressional intent
to carry forward any features of the old provision."); Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 93 (1934
Amendment removed restriction to matters in which government has financial or
proprietary interest).
Act ofJune 18, 1934, ch. 587, § 35, 48 Stat. 996.
See supra note 7.
See, e.g., United States v. Medina De Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 547 (9th Cir. 1986).
,U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"2 Stephen Michael Everhart, Can You Lie to the Government and Get Away With It?
The Exculpatory-No Defense Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 99 W. VA. L. REv. 687, 693 (1997).
Id. at 694 (citing Pennslyvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990)).
aid.
The Court has repeatedly held that the privilege "is not triggered unless there is




and has forced him to confess or lie.ss When an accused is ef-
fectively "boxed-in" in this way, his Fifth Amendment fights are
invoked . The Court has held that the privilege of self-
incrimination is "founded on our unwillingness to subject those
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, ly-
ing, or punishable silence. "38 Some courts were uncomfortable
finding § 1001 liability when a suspect had faced a similar tri-
lemma.
C. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Concerned that prosecutors would use the broad language
of § 1001 to punish minor criminal activity or even lawful activ-
ity, some courts responded by adopting an exception for the
mere denial of guilt.39 This exception became known as the
"exculpatory no" doctrine. ° Under this doctrine, a protected
response must generally be exculpatory and limited to simple
words of denial.41 First, a response is exculpatory "if it conveys
false information in a situation in which a truthful reply would
have incriminated the interrogee. 42  Second, simple words of
denial cover statements like "'No, I did not,' 'none,' or 'never,'"
but do not cover more elaborate stories of fabrication.4' For ex-
ample, if an FBI agent questioned a suspect about receiving ille-
"Id at 694.
" Id, An example of a "boxed-in" witness is one who, under a grant of legislative
immunity, is ordered to testify or face contempt. Id. at 694 n.32 (citing South Dakota
v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562-63 (1983)).
'Id. at 694 (quoting Muniz, 496 U.S. at 597).
"9 Giles A. Birch, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No,
57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1273, 1279 (1990).
40 Although the actual term "exculpatory no" was first used in United States v.
McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962), the exception to § 1001 liability was first articu-
lated in a Maryland district court in 1955 and in the Fifth Circuit in 1962. See Lt. Col.
Bart Hillyer & Maj. Ann D. Shane, The "Exculpatory No:" Where Did It Go?, 45 A.F.L.
Rev. 133, 13941 (1998) (citing United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955);
Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962)).
"' See Scott D. Pomfret, A Tempered 'Yes' to the 'Exculpatory No,'96 McH. L. REv. 754,
755 (1997) (citing Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, What Statements Fall Within Exculpatory
Denial Exception to Prohibition, Under 18 U.S.C.S. § 1001 [sic], Against Knowingly and
Willfully Making False Statement Which is Material to Matter Within Jurisdiction of Depart-




gal income and that suspect falsely responded, "No, I did not,"
then the suspect would qualify for an exception to § 1001 liabil-
ity under the "exculpatory no" doctrine." The suspect's re-
sponse would be a simple denial of guilt made in a situation
where the truth would have been incriminating.5 Prior to Bro-
gan v. United States,46 the Supreme Court had never examined
the "exculpatory no" doctrine, even though lower courts had
wrestled with the doctrine for decades. 47 In fact, the circuits di-
vided sharply over the validity of the "exculpatory no" doctrine.
48
Seven circuits have adopted the "exculpatory no" doctrine
in order to limit criminal liability under § 1001.49 Although the
circuits approached the doctrine differently,0 each basically
held "that Section 1001 is generally not applicable to false
statements that are essentially exculpatory denials of criminal
"Id& (citing Paternostro v. United States), 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962), overruled by
United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
4' Id at 756.
" 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
17 See Hillyer & Shane, supra note 40, at 133, 149.
0 Compare Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Tay-
lor, 907 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222 (9th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Tabor, 788 F.2d 714 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874 (10th
Cir. 1980); and United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1975), with United
States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. Brogan v. United, 118 S. Ct.
805 (1998); and United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (overruling Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962)).
'9 The First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted the "exculpatory no" doctrine. See Moser, 18 F.3d at 473-74; Taylor, 907 F.2d
at 805; Equihua-Juarz, 851 F.2d at 1224; Cogdel 844 F.2d at 183; Tabor, 788 F.2d at
717-19; Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d at 880-81; Chevoor, 526 F.2d at 183-84.
"The scope of the doctrine has been limited by courts in various ways, including
one or more of the following: (1) The statement must be a mere denial of guilt and
not an affirmative misrepresentation; (2) A truthful answer must have incriminated
the declarant; (3) The declarant must be unaware that he is under investigation; (4)
The nature of the government inquiry must be investigative and not administrative;
(5) The false statement must not impair the basic functions of the government
agency; (6) The false statement must be unrelated to a privilege or a claim against the
government; (7) The false statement must be oral and unsworn; (8) The false state-
ment must be a response to an inquiry initiated by a federal agency or department.
SeeThomas, supra note 41, at §§ 3-10 (1991).
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activity., 51 Courts adopting the "exculpatory no" doctrine were
concerned with legislative intent and Fifth Amendment values.52
First, these courts held that Congress did not intend for § 1001
to criminalize a false statement that constituted an "exculpatory
no. 53 Second, these courts had a "distaste for an application of
the statute that is uncomfortably close to the Fifth Amendment"
privilege against self-incrimination.54
In contrast, the Second and Fifth Circuits have expressly re-
jected the "exculpatory no" doctrine.5 Both circuits argued that
the plain language of § 1001 does not admit an exception for a
mere denial of guilt.5 6 Their method of statutory interpretation
differed from proponents of the "exculpatory no" doctrine in
that they "approached the statute by looking not at its purpose,
but at its plain language."57 Although the Fifth Circuit agreed
that the purpose of § 1001 was to prohibit perversions of gov-
ernmental functions, it refused to limit the statute to that pur-
pose, "not because the rationale was an inaccurate
characterization of the statute's purpose, but because such a
limitation would conflict with its text."58 The Second Circuit
found that the legislative history of § 1001 was inconclusive and,
therefore, had no effect on the interpretation of the statute's
plain language 9 These circuits also rejected the claim that
", Kara L. Preissel & Peter P. Rahbar, False Statements, 35 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 687, 699
(1998) (quoting United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom.
Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998)).
52 See id; Birch, supra note 39, at 1281.
13 See Preissel & Rahbar, supra note 51, at 699-700 (citing United States v. Taylor,
907 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir
1988)).
"' United States v. Medina De Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 547 (9th Cir. 1986); see also su-
pra Part lI.B.
"' United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Brogan v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998); United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040,
1050 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298
(5th Cir. 1962)).
56 Wiener, 96 F.3d at 38; Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1044.
57 Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1047.
I5'. at 1047 n.17.
9 ener, 96 F.3d at 39 (citing Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 708 (1995)
("Courts should not rely on inconclusive statutory history as a basis for refusing to
give effect to the plain language of an Act of Congress.")).
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Fifth Amendment values justify the "exculpatory no" doctrine.60
They reasoned that the Fifth Amendment does not allow a per-
son to lie instead of remaining silent.6' Therefore, they con-
cluded that "[t]he Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination... lends no weight whatever to the 'exculpatory
no doctrine.'
62
Finally, "the Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have neither
adopted nor rejected the 'exculpatory no' doctrine." While
the doctrine has been raised in these circuits as a defense, the
courts avoided adopting or rejecting the doctrine by holding
that the exception, if there were one, would not apply to the
facts of the given case.6 Therefore, none of these circuits ever
reached the merits of the doctrine.8
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
James Brogan was a member of Local 32E, Service Employ-
ees International Union, AFL-CIO.6 He had been a member
since 1951 and was a union officer in 1987 and 1988.67 JRD
Management Corporation ('jRD") was a real estate company
that employed members of the union.r During his term as a
union officer, Brogan accepted several cash payments from
JRD 0 The last payment, $150, was accepted on December 14,
1988.70
See iti at 39; Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1049.
"See Wener, 96 F.3d at 39; Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1049.
Wiener, 96 F.3d at 39; see Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1049.
6 Wiener, 96 F.3d at 37 (citing United States v. LeMaster, 54 F.3d 1224, 1229-30
(6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 1992); United States
v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
" See Hillyer & Shane, supra note 40, at 145, 146, 148 (citing United States v.
LeMaster, 54 F.3d 1224, 1229-30 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 641,
647 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 273-74 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
65Id-
"Wiener, 96 F.3d at 36.
67 Id.
Id.; Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 807 (1998).
Brogan accepted four or five cash payments. Compare Brogan v. United States,
118 S. Ct. 805, 813 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (accused of accepting five cash pay-
1999] 913
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Federal agents from the Department of Labor and the In-
ternal Revenue Service investigatedJRD.7' The agents searched
JRD's headquarters and removed records that showed Brogan
had accepted bribes from the company.72 On the evening of
October 4, 1993, the agents surprised Brogan at his home.7" At
that time, the agents possessed documentary evidence that Bro-
gan had accepted several cash payments from.JRD. 74 The agents
identified themselves and asked Brogan for his "cooperation in
an investigation of JRD and various individuals." 75 Brogan was
not advised of his right to remain silent,76 nor was he told that it
was a crime to make a false statement to a federal agent until af-
ter he responded to questioning.77 The agents only told Brogan
that he would need an attorney to cooperate in the investiga-
tion.78 They told him "that if he wished to cooperate, he should
have an attorney contact the U.S. Attorney's Office, and that if
he could not afford an attorney, one could be appointed for
him."7
At that point, the agents asked Brogan if he would be will-
ing to answer some of their questions."' He agreed to question-
ing and was asked "whether he had ever received any cash or
gifts fromJRD when he was a union officer," to which he simply
answered "no."8' One of the agents testified that they next told
Brogan that they had searched JRD headquarters and had
documents in their possession showing that he had, in fact, ac-
cepted cash from JRD. Then, they told him that "lying to fed-
ments) with Petitioner's Brief at 2-3, Brogan (No. 96-1579) (accused of accepting four
cash payments).
7 0 Peitioner's Brief at 2, Brogan (No. 96-1579).
71 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 807.
7 Wkner, 96 F.3d at 36.
73 Petitioner's Brief at 2, Brogan (No. 96-1579).
7' Id. at 4.
75 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 807.
76 Petitioner's Brief at 3 n.1, Brogan (No. 96-1579).
n Id. at 4.
78 United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1996), affd sub norm. Brogan v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 807.
80 1&
8 Id. at 807-08.
"Wwener, 96 F.3d at 36.
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eral agents in the course of an investigation was a crime." Bro-
gan did not change his answers or say anything further on the
issue.s Moments later the interview ended.
s
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Brogan and several co-defendants were tried before ajury in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.ts The jury found Brogan guilty of accepting unlawful cash
payments from an employer and of making a false statement to
a federal agent.87 He was fined $4000 and sentenced to nine
months imprisonment followed by two years of supervised re-
lease.ts The court stayed execution of the sentence.89
Brogan and his co-defendants appealed.90 Brogan claimed
that his conviction under § 1001 should be reversed because his
false statement qualified as an "exculpatory no."9' He pointed
out that many circuits excluded an "exculpatory no" from §
1001 criminal liability.92 However, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to adopt "the so-called
'exculpatory no' doctrine,"93 and consequently affinned Bro-
gan's conviction. 4
Like the Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits, the Second had
neither adopted nor rejected the "exculpatory no" doctrine.9 5
The doctrine had been argued as a defense before the court,




7 1& (violating 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(b) (1), (a) (2), (d) (2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001). At
trial, the payments that Brogan accepted prior to December 14, 1998, were not ad-
missible as evidence of his accepting bribes because the statute of limitations had run.
However, the payments were admitted to show that he made a false statement. Peti-
tioner's Brief at 3, Brogan (No. 96-1579).
Petitioner's Brief at 2, Brogan (No. 96-1579).
9 Id.
90 United States v. Wiener, 96 F.d 35 (2nd Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nora. Brogan v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
9 I- at 36-37.
Id. at 37.
I& at 36, 37.
"Id. at 36, 40.
9 Id. at 37.
1999]
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but the court "always found it inapplicable to the facts of a given
case."96 The court noted that seven courts of appeals 7 had cre-
ated a 'judicially-crafted" exception to § 1001 liability for a mere
denial of guilt.9' It agreed that, in these circuits, Brogan's sim-
ple "no" would not be criminal.9 Nevertheless, the court re-
fused to adopt the doctrine.'l°
The Second Circuit found no support for the "exculpatory
no" doctrine in § 1001's plain language, the statute's legislative
history, or the Fifth Amendment.101 First, the court found that
the statute's language was clear.10 2 Then, it noted that "'as a
matter of common sense and plain meaning, the word 'no' is
indeed a statement." ' 10 3 Since § 1001's plain language was clear,
the court criticized other courts of appeals for creating 'judicial
gloss" on the text.0 4 The court implied that those courts of ap-
peals exceeded their authority because § 1001 was not ambigu-
ous and did not yield absurd results. 0 5
Second, the Court found nothing in § 1001's legislative his-
tory to support creating an exception for an "exculpatory no."06
The court briefly reviewed the statute's history of amendments
96 Id.; see; e.g., United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1474 (2d Cir. 1995); United States
v. Cervone, 907 F.2d 332, 343 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054,
1069 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd in part on other grounds, 817 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1987); United
States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1962).
9 The First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted the "exculpatory no" doctrine. Wiener, 96 F.3d at 37. However, the circuits
differ concerning the content or scope of the doctrine. Id. at 37, 40; see generally John
E. Davis & Michael K. Forde, Tenth Survey of White Collar Crime: False Statenents, 32 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 323, 331 nn.37-42 (1995); Timothy L Nicholson, Note, Just Say "No": An
Analysis of the "Exculpatory No"Doctrine, 39 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 225, 232-49
(1991); Thomas, supra note 41 at 751-96.
Wiener, 96 F.3d at 37.
99 Id.
101 Id. at 39-40.
102 I& at 38.
'03 Id, (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1994)
(en banc)).
1Id. (quoting Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469, 473 (7th Cir. 1994)).
103 Id, (citing Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 702-03 (1995); Demarest v.
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)).
'06 Id.; see Thomas, supra note 41, at 748-49 (describing legislative history as alleged
basis for "exculpatory no" doctrine).
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and recodifications, concluding that "the long-term trend [was]
one of expansion."0 7 The court questioned why other courts of
appeals had limited liability in the face of this "trend of expan-
sion."0 0 8 It reasoned that only Congress could narrow the liabil-
ity of an unambiguous statute,1°9 especially when the legislative
history is inconclusive" 0
Third, the court found that Fifth Amendment concerns
about § 1001 were unfounded."' Although some courts of ap-
peals claimed that "Fifth Amendment values" supported adopt-
ing the "exculpatory no" doctrine, it simply and firmly stated
that "the Fifth Amendment has no application to circumstances
in which a person lies instead of remaining silent.""' An indi-
vidual has no constitutional right to lie.13 Therefore, the court
held that the Fifth Amendment was irrelevant to the validity of
the "exculpatory no" doctrine."4
Since the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no
support for the doctrine in § 1001's literal text, its legislative his-
tory, or in the Fifth Amendment, the court refused to join the
majority of circuits that had adopted the "exculpatory no" doc-
trine.' 5 In rejecting the doctrine, the court rejected Brogan's
'0 Wiener, 96 F.3d at 38-39.108 1&
' Id. The court found it compelling that Congress refused to pass at least two bills
that would have narrowed § 1001 liability. Id. (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Rios,
14 F.3d 1040, 1048 n.19 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing Criminal Code Revision Act
of 1980, H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1742 (1980); Criminal Code Reform Act of
1981, S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1343(a) (1) (A) (1981))).
110 Wener, 96 F.3d at 38-39. The court heeded the Supreme Court's instruction
"'not to rely on inconclusive statutory history as a basis for refusing to give effect to
the plain language of an Act of Congress."' Id. (quoting Hubbard v. United States,
514 U.S. 695, 708 (1995)).
i !d. at 39-40.
Id. at 39.
"' Id (citing United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1320-21 (6th Cir. 1991) (en
banc)).
114 Id
..5 Id at 39-40. However, the court left open the question of whether a defendant
must know that making a false statement is criminal in order to violate § 1001. Id. at
40. Also, the court did not decide whether a defendant would have the requisite




defense to § 1001 false statement charges."6  Therefore, Bro-
gan's conviction was affirmed."
7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" " on
June 9, 1997 to resolve a split among the circuits regarding the
validity of the "exculpatory no" doctrine.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion written by justice Scalia," 9 the Supreme Court
affirmed the Second Circuit's rejection of an "exculpatory no"
exception to § 100)1 criminal liability. 20 While rejecting the "ex-
culpatory no" doctrine, the Court noted that is was overruling
the law in seven circuits.121 These circuits had ruled that a mere
denial of guilt fell outside the scope of § 1001.122 However, the
Court found no support for this judicially crafted exception.
The Court first looked at the relevant text of § 1001,124
which "covers 'any' false statement-that is, a false statement 'of
whatever kind.""25 The word "no" by itself is a statement, albeit
unelaborated, that can be contextually false. 26 Relying on a dic-
"6 Id. at 36-37.
17 Id at 40.
"8 Brogan v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
"9 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined
Justice Scalia in the majority opinion. Justice Souterjoined in part. Brogan v. United
States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 807 (1998).
'2 Id. at 812.
' The First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had ex-
plicitly adopted the "exculpatory no" doctrine. Id. at 808.
"'However, even among the circuits that had adopted the doctrine, there was sub-
stantial divergence concerning the content of the "exculpatory no" doctrine. Id For
example, the circuits had developed different tests for whether a particular statement
qualified as a mere denial of guilt. Id. (citing Thomas, supra note 41, at 742).
' Id. at 811-12.
"2 Id at 808; see supra note 7 for relevant text of § 1001.
"' Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997)).
'2 Brogan actually conceded that his simple "no" response to the federal agents'
questioning would be criminal under a literal reading of § 1001. Id.; see Petitioner's
Brief at 5, Brogan (No. 96-1579).
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tionary definition of the word "statement,"127 the Court summa-
rily concluded that § 1001 literally covers an "exculpatory no.' 28
Next, the Court criticized'2 proponents of the "exculpatory
no" doctrine for relying too heavily on a dictum in United States
v. Gilliland °30 In Gilliland, the Court was asked to interpret the
predecessor to § 1001.1' In dicta, the Court stated that the 1934
amendment indicated "'congressional intent to protect the
authorized functions of governmental departments and agen-
cies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive
practices described"' in the statute.32 However, the Court in
Brogan explained that although it identified congressional in-
tent in Gilliland, it did not hold that the congressional intent
limited the scope of § 1001.33 The Court was adamant that "it
is not, and cannot be, our practice to restrict the unqualified
language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress was try-
ing to remedy .... "3 Therefore, the Court rejected Brogan's
argument that § 1001 covers only those statements made to fed-
eral agents that pervert governmental functions. '3 More gener-
ally, the Court rejected "the broad proposition that criminal
'2 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808 (citing WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2461 (2d ed. 1950) (def. 2: "That which is stated; an embodiment in words of facts or
opinions")).
1 Id.
'" Id. at 809.
"o 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
"'Id. at 89-90.
S2 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 809 (quoting United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93
(1941)).
" I& The Court rejected Brogan's limitation, but it identified some specific in-
stances when a statute's reach may be limited. Id. at 810-11. First, the Court may in-
terpret a statute narrowly when it "[does] not purport to be departing from a
reasonable reading of the text." Id. at 810-11 (citing United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1994); Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286-87
(1982)). Second, it may apply a "background interpretive principle of general appli-
cation." Id. at 811 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994) (reading
in a mens rea requirement); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446
(1932) (exempting violations induced by entrapment); United States v. Palmer, 3
Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (not applying statute extraterritorially to noncitizens)).
Third, "[c] riminal prohibitions do not generally apply to reasonable enforcement ac-
tions by officers of the law." I&; see 2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES §
142(a), at 121 (1984).
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statutes do not have to be read as broadly as they are written,
but are subject to case-by-case exceptions." 116 It explained that
this broad judicial rule could not be applied consistently or
predictably.
13 7
Even assuming that § 1001 criminalizes only those false
statements that pervert governmental functions, the Court
found that Brogan's "exculpatory no" perverted a proper gov-
ernment function.1m Brogan was under criminal investigation
for accepting bribes from union officials. 39 A criminal investiga-
tion is clearly a function of the federal government. 40 Further-
more, the purpose of every investigation is to find the truth.
14 1
The Court concluded that any false statement in the course of
an investigation would serve to frustrate the government's pur-
pose in uncovering the truth.
4 2
The Court considered the corollary argument that an inves-
tigation is not perverted if the investigators do not believe the
false statement.1 43  However, the inquiry then becomes not
whether the false statement was made, but whether the lie was
convincing. 44 By analogy to the crime of perjury,4 5 the Court
rejected the defense that Brogan's false statement was not be-
lieved.
146
Next, the Court found that a literal reading of § 1001 would
not offend the spirit the Fifth Amendment.' 47 The Fifth
Amendment confers the right to remain silent upon criminal
'6 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 811.
"
7 Id.
,' Id. at 808-09.
139 See supra Part III.A





' It is no defense to a charge of perjury that the jurors did not believe and were
not influenced by the false testimony. Id. at 809 n.1 (citing United States v. Abrams,
568 F.2d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 1978); 70 CJ.S. Perjuiy § 13 at 260-61 (1987)).
46 Id. at 808-09.




defendants."" The Court concluded that "[i] n the modem age
of frequently dramatized 'Miranda' warnings," it was "implausi-
ble" that a person under investigation may be unaware of this
right. 9 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that there is no
excuse to lie, just because silence can be used against a per-
son." Therefore, the Court rejected the contention that silence
was not a realistic option.'5
The Court had little tolerance for liars. It stated,
"[w]hether or not the predicament of the wrongdoer run to
ground tugs at the heart strings, neither the text nor the spirit
of the Fifth Amendment confers a privilege to lie."52 The Court
was critical of, not sympathetic towards, the guilty suspect who
must chose between admitting guilt, remaining silent, or lying.5 '
The guilty suspect can lawfully remain silent. 54 But, his "excul-
patory no" would be a lie. 55 The Court found no support in the
Fifth Amendment for a privilege to lie. 56
Lastly, the Court dismissed popular concern that § 1001 will
be abused by prosecutors. The concern is that prosecutors
will use § 1001 to manufacture crime or to punish a simple de-
"'Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 810.
19 Id. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court found that unless a suspect was "in custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," it was implau-
sible that the suspect was unaware of his right to remain silent. 384 U.S. 436, 445
(1966).




1 Id. Borrowing the term from Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor; 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964), Brogan labeled the situation of a guilty suspect a "cruel trilemma."
Petitioner's Brief at 11, Brogan (No. 96-1579). The Court responded that a guilty per-
son has only himself to blame for creating the difficult situation. Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at
810 (citing RonaldJ. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and
Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1016 (1996) (arguing that the innocent person
lacks even a "lemma")). The Court also criticized Brogan for manipulating the term
in order to validate the "exculpatory no" doctrine. Id. at 810. Originally, in Murphy,
the Court recognized "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt."
378 U.S. at 55.







nial of guilt more harshly than the underlying crime. 58 The
Court indicated that no evidence was presented to show past
abuse or a future threat of abuse.9  Moreover, even if prosecu-
tors could abuse § 1001, adopting the "exculpatory no" doctrine
would not solve the problem.W The Court suggested that inves-
tigators would simply pressure the suspect into a more detailed
response than the simple "no.' 61 Regardless, it said that
"[c] ourts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no
matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so .... 62
After reviewing Gilliland, the Fifth Amendment, and policy
concerns, the Court concluded that the only support for the
"exculpatory no" doctrine was that seven circuits had adopted
it.63 Unlike the dissent, the Court did not place much weight
on common opinion.1r4 Thus, it was not persuaded to depart
from a literal reading of the text.'0 Since the plain language of
§ 1001 did not support the "exculpatory no" doctrine, the Court
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.66
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
In a brief concurrence,67 Justice Souter stated that he
joined the majority opinion except for its discussion of whether
prosecutors could potentially abuse § 1001 as now written.'6a On






2 Id. at 811-12. The Court agreed with Justice Stevens' dissent that a felony con-
viction for a simple "no" may seem harsh. Id. at 811. However, the Court stated that
it would not ignore harsh penalties unless specifically instructed to do so by the Con-
stitution of the United States. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 3;
U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
165 Brogan, 118 S. CL at 811.
'" The Court stated that since common opinion is not consistently followed, "it be-
comes yet another user-friendlyjudicial rule to be invoked ad libitum." Id.
'
5 Id. at 812.
1667i




congressional attention to the risks inherent in the statute's cur-
rent breadth."16
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Concurring in the judgment, 70 Justice Ginsburg wrote sepa-
rately "to call attention to the extraordinary authority Congress,
perhaps unwittingly, has conferred on prosecutors to manufac-
ture crimes.",7 Although she admitted that § 1001's plain lan-
guage covered an "exculpatory no,' 72 she warned that federal
agents could abuse the broad language.
First, Justice Ginsburg summarized the facts of both the pre-
sent case 74 and United States v. Tabor.175 She suggested that these
cases are not rare. 78 In Tabor, during the course of a criminal
investigation, IRS agents discovered that a notary public had no-
tarized a deed without having the signatory appear in front of
her. 77 The notary public had violated Florida state law in doing
so. 7 Knowing this, the IRS agents went to her home and ques-
tioned her about the deed. 79 The agents did not tell her that
she was under investigation or that making a false statement was
a felony.' s When she lied to the agents, saying that the signa-
tory had signed the deed before her, the agents charged her
with a § 1001 violation. 8' Justice Ginsburg commented, "an IRS
9 (SouterJ., concurring).
'
70 Justice Souterjoined justice Ginsburg's concurrence. Id.
7 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 812 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
,7 In fact, Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment because the broad lan-
guage of § 1001 covered Brogan's simple "no." Id. at 812 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
7 Id. at 812 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
' Id. (GinsburgJ., concurring); see also supra Part IHA.
'7 Brogan, 118 S. CL at 812-13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see United States v. Ta-
bor, 788 F.2d 714 (1lth Cir. 1986) (invoking the "exculpatory no" doctrine to reverse
a § 1001 conviction).
176 Brogan, 118 S. CL at 813 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see United States v. Gold-
fine, 538 F.2d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924, 927
(7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Dempsey, 740 F. Supp. 1299, 1306 (N.D. II. 1990).
'7 Brogan, 118 S. CL at 812 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Tabor, 788 F.2d at 715-16.
178 Brogan, 118 S. CL at 812 (GinsburgJ., concurring); see Tabor, 788 F.2d at 716.
7 Brogan, 118 S. CL at 812 (GinsburgJ., concurring); see Tabor, 788 F.2d at 716.
"" Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 812 (GinsburgJ., concurring); see Tabor, 788 F.2d at 716.
1.. Brogan, 118 S. CL at 812 (Ginsburg,J., concurring); see Tabor, 788 F.2d at 716.
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agent thus turned a violation of state law into a federal felony by
,,182
eliciting a lie that misled no one.
Justice Ginsburg argued that these casual investigations
catch suspects off guard.13 Not only are the suspects often not
put under oath, but they are not "Mirandized" and not warned
that giving a false statement is felony.18 4  For example, Brogan
was told only after he spoke that his "exculpatory no" was a
criminal offense.1
In the above examples § 1001 effectively punished the lie
more harshly than the underlying criminal act.8 6 Justice Gins-
burg also identified two ways in which § 1001 may be abused to
"escalate completely innocent conduct into a felony." 87 First, if
the prosecutors fail to prove all the elements of a crime, a sus-
pect should be found not guilty. However, Justice Ginsburg
noted that if the prosecutors can get the suspect to lie about
one fact they know to be true from the investigation, then they
could bring a § 1001 charge in place of the charge they cannot
prove."" Second, sometimes the statute of limitations has tolled,
as it did on four out of five of the bribery charges against Bro-
gan.189 Justice Ginsburg suggested that investigators could get
the suspect to lie about the wrongdoing in order to "revive" the
charges. 90 In either example, the government is using § 1001 to
manufacture crime. 191
Justice Ginsburg then reviewed the legislative history of §
1001 and concluded that "it is doubtful Congress intended §
1001 to cast so large a net.', 92 *The relevant part of the statute
182 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 812-13 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
Id at 813 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
184 Id (GinsburgJ., concurring).
Id- (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
188Id (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
R87 Id (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 36) (emphasis added).
Justice Ginsburg uses the phrase "innocent conduct" here to refer both to blameless
conduct and to blameworthy conduct that the State cannot prove.
SId. (GinsburgJ., concurring).
... Id- (GinsburgJ., concurring).
Id (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
1 Id. (GinsburgJ., concurring).
'
8Id. at 813-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring);
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has remained the same since 1934.193 The history tends to show
that Congress amended the statute in 1934 in order to "protect
the Government from being the victim of some positive state-
ment which has the tendency and effect of perverting normal
and proper governmental activities and functions."'4 Justice
Ginsburg admitted that the plain language of the statute says
nothing about criminalizing only those false statements that
pervert governmental functions. 5  However, she found it
"noteworthy" that the statute is currently being invoked in situa-
tions that differ greatly from those Congress sought to remedy
in 1934.'
Justice Ginsburg also found it compelling that since the
Court's decision in Nunley v. United States,97 it has been the policy
of the Department of Justice not to prosecute the mere denial
of guilt under § 1001.19" The United States Attorney's Manual
firmly declared this policy both at the time charges were filed
against Brogan' 99 and while the case was pending before the
Court.200 Justice Ginsburg stated that this policy indicates "the
dubious propriety of bringing felony prosecutions for bare ex-
culpatory denials informally made to Government agents. '0 '
,93 Id at 814 (GinsburgJ., concurring); see supra Part HA.
' Brogan, 118 S. CL at 814 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Paternostro v.
United States, 311 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1962)).
"' Id. (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
'96IR (GinsburgJ., concurring).
'9 434 U.S. 962 (1977). In Nunley, the Court vacated a § 1001 conviction at the
government's urging, because the Department of Justice "normally refused" permis-
sion to prosecute an "exculpatory no" statement under § 1001. Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at
815 (citing Memorandum for United States at 7, Nunley (No. 77-5069)).
"6 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 814-15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The Sentencing Guide-
lines articulate a similar policy. Id. at 815 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDENES MANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt., n.1 (1997)).
'" When charges were filed against Brogan, the Manual read: "Where the state-
ment takes the form of an 'exculpatory no,' 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not apply regard-
less who asks the question." Id at 815 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting United
States Attorneys' Manual 1 9-42.160 (Oct. 1, 1988)).
"o While the case was pending, the Manual read: "It is the Department's policy not
to charge a Section 1001 violation in situations in which a suspect, during an investi-
gation, merely denies guilt in response to questioning by the government." Id at 815




She counseled lower courts not to interpret the Court's opinion
as encouraging § 1001 prosecutions for exculpatory nos.0 2
Justice Ginsburg feared that the policy outlined in the
United States Attorneys' Manual was an inadequate control.2 3
She concluded her concurrence by urging Congress to limit the
reach of § 1001.204 Justice Ginsburg reviewed the recommenda-
tions that were made some years ago to revise § 1001.205 She
suggested that although these recommendations were never
206adopted, the present case should revive the issue.
D. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented 2 7 because he believed that the
Court rashly rejected a doctrine that had wide-based support.
He agreed that an "exculpatory no" would fall under the broad
language of § 1001, but he argued that the Court could inter-
pret a criminal statute more narrowly than it is written. 09 As
evidence, he reviewed case law where the Court had limited the
210plain language of the text. Justice Stevens noted that al-
Id- (GinsburgJ., concurring).
Id. at 815-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg implied that other in-
adequate controls include, the "knowingly and willfully" requirement in statute's
plain language and the new "materiality" requirement added in the 1996 revision of
statute. Id
Id. at 815 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
"' In 1981, the Senate Judiciary Committee proposed revising the statute to in-
clude a defense for mere denial of involvement in the crime. Id. at 816 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (citing S. Rep. No. 97-307, p. 407 (1981)). However, the 1981 Senate Bill
would have still made it illegal either to volunteer a false statement or to make a false
statement after an adequate warning. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing S. Rep.
No. 97-307, p. 408 (1981)). The 1980 HouseJudiciary Report would have written an
exception into § 1001 for oral statements not made under oath. Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 96-1396, pp. 181-83 (1980)). Finally, the 1971 law
reform commission would have excluded all information given during an investiga-
tion unless the suspect was under a legal duty to speak. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) (citing Nat'l Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report §
1352(3)).
Id. at 816-17 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
" Justice BreyerjoinedJustice Stevens' dissent. Id. at 817.
2w Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 817 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
' Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
20 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
U.S. 64, 68-69 (1994); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 619 (1994); Williams
926 [Vol. 89
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though the literal text of § 1001 reached federal agents as well
as criminal suspects, he was confident that Congress did not in-
tend to make it a crime for law enforcement officials to speak
falsely to suspects. Similarly, he was confident that Congress
did not intend to criminalize a suspect's mere denial of guilt.
212
Justice Stevens stated that a literal reading of § 1001 would yield
"essentially arbitrary applications and harmful results."
Additionally, Justice Stevens criticized the Court for ignor-
ing "the virtual uniform understanding of the bench and the
bar .... ,,214 Seven circuits had adopted the "exculpatory no"
doctrine with approval of the Court and the Department of Jus-
215tice. Justice Stevens fully supported the proposition that
"communis opinio216 is of good authority in law., 217
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court, in Brogan v. United States, properly
concluded that the plain language of § 1001 covers mere denials
of guilt and is therefore inconsistent with the "exculpatory no"
exception that had been adopted in seven circuits. Everyjustice
conceded that the literal text of § 1001 was unambiguous.
Moreover, congressional intent was unclear22 and policy con-
v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286 (1982); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448
(1932); United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818)).
2" Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 817 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
212 Id (StevensJ, dissenting).
2,3 & at 817 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299,
423 (1996) (BreyerJ., dissenting)).
21 Id. at 817 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
i &. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Nunley v. United States, 434 U.S. 962
(1997) (containing a lengthy discussion of cases that have endorsed the "exculpatory
no" doctrine); see also Central Bank of Denver, NA v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 192-98 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); McNally v. United States,
483 U.S. 350, 362-364, 376 (1987) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
216 Common opinion.
217 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 817-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE,
INSTrlTES 186a (15th ed. 1794)); see also United States v. The Reindeer, 27 F. Cas.
758, 762, No. 16, 145 (C.C.D.R.I. 1848); Isherwood v. Oldknow, 3 Maule & Selwyn
382, 396-97 (KLB. 1815).
21 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
2,9 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808, 812 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), 817 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
' Id at 809, 814 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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cerns articulated by Justice Ginsburg, although worthy of serious
consideration, had not materialized in circuits where the "ex-
culpatory no" defense is not recognized.221 Although the Brogan
decision was not consistent with the common opinion of the
courts of appeals,222 the decision was consistent with the "revival
of textualist statutory interpretation on the Court.",2   Brogan has
already been generally cited in support of relying on statutes'
"plain meaning;" 224 thus, the decision has implications beyond §
1001.
A. BROGANWAS CORRECTLY DECIDED
If one accepts the "new textualist" approach,2 then the
Court's holding that the "exculpatory no" doctrine cannot be
reconciled with the plain language of § 1001 is straightforward
and justified. The statute's language is clear: Section 1001
criminalizes "any false statement."2 26 The grammar is not con-
fusing and the words are not complex. Nevertheless, some
scholars have found that the language is "neither plain nor sim-
ple." 227 They argue that the text contains terms that are am-
biguous, such as "willfully," "false," and "statement.' ' 2ss Some
courts have, in fact, struggled with the definition of "statement,"
ultimately finding that a simple "no" is nonassertive and there-
fore not a "statement." 229 However, the Court properly rejected
2'' Id. at 810.
22 1d at 817-18 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2 Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigor-
ating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY.
L.J. 527,527 (1998).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1344-45 (10th Cir.
1998) (citing Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998)), vacated and reh'g en banc
granted (July 10, 1998); Carlson v. Ferguson, 9 F. Supp. 2d. 654, 657 (S.D.W. Vir.
1998) (citing Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998)).
See infra Part V.B.
22 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808; see supraPart HA. for full text of § 1001.
Promfret, supra note 41, at 763 (citing United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 76-
77 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he language ... of § 1001 can provide 'no
more than a guess as to what Congress intended.'") (quoting Ladner v. United States,
358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958))).
22 Id. at 765.
22 See Hillyer & Shane, supra note 40, at 141-42 (citing Paternostro v. United States,
311 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 205 (D.
Md. 1955); United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Colo. 1953)).
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the argument that the language is ambiguous.230 In fact, all
nine Justices agreed that the "unqualified language" of
211§ 1001 covers a statement consisting of an exculpatory no.
Additionally, the Court was correct in finding that, under
the facts of this case, the unambiguous statutory language
trumped both congressional intent and adverse policy implica-232 233
tions 2 The legislative history of § 1001 was inconclusive. Al-
though there was evidence that Congress expanded § 1001 in
1934 in order to prohibit the "perversion of governmental func-
tions,"2 there was no indication that Congress intended to limit
the prohibition to this purpose.3 Certainly, in 1934 Congress
may never have imagined that § 1001 would be used to prose-
cute an "exculpatory no. " s But subsequent cases have used the
statute in this manner and, despite numerous opportunities to
amend § 1001, Congress has never done so. Furthermore, the
Court should not be required to correct the careless drafting of
Congress unless the intent of Congress is very clear.238
2" Brogan, 118 S. Ct at 808. The Court relied on a dictionary definition of the word
"statement" in concluding that the statute's language covered a simple "no" in re-
sponse to a question. Id.
Id at 812 (GinsburgJ., concurring), 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22 Id at 813; see Everhart, supra note 32, at 708, 713 ("[W]hile the exculpatory-no
defense may be suggested by some of the old statutory history of § 1001, the plain
language of § 1001 and Supreme Court precedent trumps that old statutory his-
tory.").
"' Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 809; cf. id at 814 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
2m United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941); see Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 814
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 302
(5th Cir. 1962)); see also Promfret, supra note 41, at 759-62 (arguing congressional in-
tent to protect government from deception and interference with its functions).
ws Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 809.
26 Id. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Birch, supra note 39, at 1279-80 (justify-
ing "exculpatory no" doctrine because Congress could not have intended use of §
1001 against suspects who merely denied guilt).
"7 Id. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Everhart, supra note 32, at 707-08 (ar-
guing Congress considered but failed to pass bills that would have codified the "ex-
culpatory no" doctrine); but see Promfret, supra note 41, at 762 (rejecting argument
that Congress's failure to codify the doctrine is evidence of its rejection of the doc-
trine).
2
" Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 816 (Ginsburg,J., concurring) ("Congress alone can provide
the appropriate instruction."); cf. Alvin C. Harrell, Recent Developments of Interest, 52
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 2, 128-29 (1998) ("[T]he Supreme Court will no longer rou-
tinely protect the country from the ill-effects of loosely-drafted federal legislation.").
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Proponents of the "exculpatory no" doctrine argue that, in
United States v. Gilliland,2 9 the Court found that Congress
amended § 1001 in order to protect the government from per-
version of its legitimate functions.240 Their argument is uncon-
vincing because, as the Court pointed out in Brogan, the
statement in Gilliland is merely a dictum.241 Moreover, Justice
Ginsburg conceded in her concurrence that even if history sug-
gests Congress amended § 1001 with a specific purpose in mind,
nothing shows that it meant to limit the statute to this pur-
242pose.
However, Justice Ginsburg properly alerted Congress to the
discrepancy between the original purpose of § 1001 and the
current use of the statute to punish the mere denial of guilt in
• . .• 243
the course of informal investigations. She found it "doubtful
that Congress intended § 1001 to cast so large a net,"24 but nev-
ertheless agreed that the Court should not adopt the "exculpa-
tory no" exception in the face of unambiguous text.24 5  In his
dissent, Justice Stevens disagreed, arguing essentially for judicial
activism. 24 He stated that it was clear "Congress did not intend
to make every 'exculpatory no' a felony" and that the Court
should not use the literal text as an excuse for leaving the merits
of the "exculpatory no" doctrine to Congress.24 7
23 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
240 See Promfret, supra note 41, at 759 (citing United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86,
93 (1941)).
241 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 809.
2 2 Id at 809, 814 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
243 I& at 812, 814 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
244 Id. at 813 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
21 Id. at 812 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
2146 One definition of'Judicial activism" is:
Judicial philosophy which motivates judges to depart from strict adherence to ju-
dicial precedent in favor [of] progressive and new social policies which are not always
consistent with the restraint expected of appellate judges. It is commonly marked by
decisions calling for social engineering and occasionally these .isions represent intrusions
into legislative and executive matters.
BLACK'S LAW DircONARY 847 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
21 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Promfret, supra note 41, at
765 ("It is simply untrue that courts do not go beyond the plain language in making
their decisions. In fact, broad statutory language may represent a delegation of
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Without reaching the issue of whether the Court should in-
trude on legislative matters, Justice Stevens' argument fails be-
cause congressional intent simply was not as clear as he stated.248
If the Court does go beyond the literal text, it must at least have
a solid basis for doing so.24 Justices Ginsburg and Stevens had
no evidence that Congress intended to limit that scope of §
1001 liability. And, even if Congress did have that intent, Con-
gress may have chosen to rely on the discretion of a prosecutor
to limit the potential reach of the statute.2so In that case, it
would be improper for the Court to "re-write a statute simply
because [it] is discomforted by the manner in which Congress
chose to structure its enforcement...."251
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg presented no evidence that
prosecutors have abused § 1001 in circuits where the "exculpa-
tory no" doctrine has been rejected. 2 She argued that prosecu-
tors would abuse the unrestricted language of § 1001 to
manufacture crime or severely punish minor misconduct.s
However, the Court did not find this argument convincing, be-
cause no evidence showed "any history of prosecutorial excess,
either before or after widespread judicial acceptance of the 'ex-
culpatory no.' "4 In any case, the Court stated that, "Courts may
not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how al-




Nevertheless, Justice Stevens had a valid point in his dissent
that the Court ignored some serious concerns. 6 While there
power from Congress to the courts.") (citing United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 362
(1926)); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. Cr. REv. 345,
367-70 (1994)).
2 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 817 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
249 However, Justice Scalia and other new textualists would argue that it is never
appropriate to go beyond the literal text. See infra Part V.B.
See Turner, supra note 26, at 231-32.
"' Id. at 231.
2 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 810, 812-13 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
" For example, if an investigator can get a suspect to deny guilt regarding in-
volvement in minor criminal activity, he can escalate the minor misconduct to a fel-
ony under § 1001. Id. at 812-13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see supra Part V.C. for
additional factual examples of prosecutorial abuse.
"' Id. at 810; see also Everhart, supra note 32, at 718.
2
" Brogan, 118 S. Ct at 811-12.
Id. at 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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was no evidence of actual abuse in circuits where the "excupa-
tory no" doctrine is not recognized, the controls in place to pro-
tect against abuse may still be inadequate. First, -since Nunley v.
United States,27 the Department ofJustice (DOJ) has maintained
an established policy against prosecuting an "exculpatory no"
under § 1001.25" This policy is clearly stated in the United States
Attorneys' Manual.259 In Nunley, the Supreme Court vacated a §
1001 conviction, because the DOJ had not given prior approval
for the prosecution. 6 In vacating the conviction, the Court
noted that the DOJ "'normally refused"' permission to prose-
cute under § 1001 for simple denials of guilt. 61 Nevertheless,
scholars have challenged the effectiveness of the DOJ's policy.
262
They argue that prosecutors are not required to get approval
from the DOJ before pressing charges so nothing prevents them
from prosecuting exculpatory nos.6 Furthermore, in addition
to stating the DOJ's policy, the United States Attorneys' Manual
states that the policy will be "rarely used" and "narrowly con-
strued."26 The suggestion that the DOJ does not enforce its pol-
icy explains how cases like Brogan have arisen and will arise in
the future.
265
Second, the Fifth Amendment confers a privilege to remain
silent.26 The Court stressed that Brogan had the right to say
nothing at all and rejected the argument that remaining silent
was not a practical option. 67 The Court found that it was "im-
plausible" that a person could be unaware of his right to remain
2 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
Id at 814-15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
'9' See United States Attorneys' Manual 1 9-42.160 (Oct. 1, 1988); See supra notes
199-200.
Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 815 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
261 I& (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Memorandum for United States at 8,
Nunley (No. 77-5069)).
2'2 SeeJonathon S. Feld, Knowing When to Say 'No: Lessons From the Brogan Ruling, 5
No. 2 Bus. CRims BuLL.: COMPLIANCE & LrnG. 5, 6 (1998).
26 id
26 Cf id. ("The absence of any approval process within the DOJ reinforces the like-
lihood of "exculpatory no" prosecutions.)
216 See supra Part ll.B.
267 Brogan, 118 S. Ct at 810.
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silent in "the modem age of frequently dramatized 'Miranda'
warnings. "2ss But, Miranda warnings are not often dramatized in
relation to informal investigations, such as unannounced visits
to private homes, because these investigations do not require
Miranda warnings.2 6 Thus, it is plausible that a person could be
unaware of his right to remain silent, especially during informal
investigations. 270 Even if a person knows that he can remain si-
lent, he may not invoke the privilege because he is not aware
that speaking falsely to an investigator is a serious crime.2 7' The
casual nature of the questioning may "'not sufficiently alert the
person interviewed to the danger that false statements may lead
to a felony conviction."'7 2
Third, the Eight Amendment prohibits "extreme punish-
ment for minor misconduct."273  In Coker v. Georgia,24 the Su-
preme Court held that "the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment bars not only punishments that
are barbaric, but also those that are excessive or are grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the crime."275 Therefore, in the-
ory, Eight Amendment rights could be invoked if a suspect is
convicted of a § 1001 felony for falsely denying very minor mis-
conduct. However, the Court in Brogan never addressed the
Eighth Amendment, suggesting that in practice courts do not
view § 1001 convictions as "cruel and unusual punishment." Af-
ter all, Congress made it a separate crime to make a false state-
" Interrogations do not require Miranda warnings unless the witness is in custody
or the functional equivalent of custody. Everhart, supra note 32, at 698-99.
' Id. at 698 n.118 ("Without formal cues, the interrogee seems unlikely to be
thinking in the language of rights.") (citing Donald D. Oliver, Note, Prosecutions for
False Statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation-The Uncertain Law, 29 SRAcuSE L.
REv. 763, 775 (1978)).
' See Birch, supra note 39, at 1276-77.
Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 813 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Ehrlichman, 379 F. Supp. 291, 292 (D.D.C. 1974)).
" 'Everhart, supra note 32, at 713. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fine imposed, nor cruel and unusual pun-
ishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
27'433 U.S. 584 (1977).
2" Id. at 592.2 76Everhart, supra note 32, at 713.
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ment and the punishment under § 1001 reflects Congress's view
that lying to the government is a serious crime.27
B. IMPLICATIONS BEYOND § 1001: BROGAN IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE TEXTUALIST MOVEMENT ON THE SUPREME COURT
The Court's decision in Brogan shut the door on a doctrine
that had existed for over forty years.28 Seven circuits had
adopted the "exculpatory no" doctrine 27 and only two circuits
had rejected it. 210 Interestingly, the Court refused to follow the
281
majority view among the circuits. 1 Yet, its decision is not sur-
prising if one considers the current attitude on the Court re-
2812garding statutory interpretation.
In 1986, President Reagan appointed Justice Antonin Scalia
to the Supreme Court.23 Since his appointment, Justice Scalia
has "aggressively challenged the Court's approach to statutory
interpretation., 28 4 He has repeatedly criticized the Court for
placing too much weight on legislative history.2  Instead, he has
pushed the Court to rely more heavily on a statute's "plain
meaning.,
286
Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation has
been termed "new textualism" by Professor William Eskridge.287
Textualists believe that statutory interpretation should not be
based on congressional intent, but rather should be based on
the statute's "plain meaning," as determined by an ordinary
2" Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 810 (1998).
27" See Pomfret, supra note 41, at 757 (stating "exculpatory no" doctrine first articu-
lated in 1955) (citing United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955)).
m The First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits explic-
itly adopted the "exculpatory no" doctrine. See supra Part II.C.
'0 The Fifth and Second Circuits rejected the "exculpatory no" doctrine. See supra
Part II.C.
281 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 811-12.
282 See Harrell, supra note 238, at 128-29 (1998) (arguing decision in Brogan is con-
sistent with Court's current emphasis on plain meaning of statutory language).
28 See Mank, supra note 223, at 527.
Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statu-
toy Construction, 17 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 401 (1994).
Id.; Cf INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) ("Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions.").
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 453.
'
7William N. Eskridge,Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990).
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reader of the statute." They generally claim "that a statute's
text alone provides the best evidence for interpretation.,
28
"New Textualists" like Justice Scalia are careful to review the en-
tire statute, taking into account the canons of statutory con-
struction and the statute's overall structure and similarity to
other legislation from the same time period.20
Although Justice Scalia has "not yet revolutionized the
Court's approach" to statutory interpretation, his influence is
nevertheless felt on the Court.29' During the last decade there
has been a noticeable "'new textualist' movement on the
Court. ' 2 As a result of Justice Scalia's influence, none of the
Court's recent decisions have "relied upon legislative history as
a determinative factor."' " This new movement is positive in so
far as it deemphasizes legislative history and focuses on the lit-
eral text of the statute.24 Although nontextualists "contend that
we should interpret a statute by determining what the legisla-
ture intended the statute to mean,", 5 intentions are not law and
therefore are arguably not relevant.26 Plus, intentions are diffi-
cult to determine, especially the intentions of a large and di-
• 297
verse group of legislators. However, there are also problems
with relying on a statute's literal text. For example, because
words or phrases often have several meanings, it can be difficult
to define the single "plain meaning" of the statuteY. As a result,
the text of a statute may be interpreted too broadly or some-
' See Mank, supra note 223, at 533-34 (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing statutory meaning is "most
in accord with context and ordinary usage")).
"g Id. at 534.
oId.
" Karkkainen, supra note 284, at 401-02; see also Mank, supra note 223, at 533.
Mank, supra note 223, at 533; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Fu-
ture of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 351, 363 (1994). Justice Thomas, and to
a lesser extentJustice Kennedy, have endorsed textualism. Id.
"' Mank, supra note 223, at 533
See Eskridge, supra note 287, at 690.
"' Karkkainen, supra note 284, at 415.
Id. at 417 ("Only those provisions expressed in the statutory text itself have the
authoritative status of law.")
"7 Id. at 415-16.
' See Mank, supra note 224, at 540 (citing Clark D. Cunningham, Plain Meaning
and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994)).
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times too narrowly in a way that frustrates the intentions of
Congress.m
On the other hand, an advantage of textualism is that
"[o]nce the statutory text is unencumbered by evidence of
original legislative expectations, it is free to evolve dynamically,"
assuming that Congress enacts later statutes that have implica-
tions on the textual interpretation of the first. °° Textualism is
also intuitively appealing because the ordinary person takes no-
tice of the literal text, not of legislative intent.30' Finally, the
movement on the Court towards textualism will have the posi-
tive effect of making Congress draft statutes more carefully. Al-
though Justice Stevens has argued that "Congress is much more
likely to override the Court's statutory interpretations if it ig-
nores a statute's legislative history,"0 02 it follows that eventually
Congress would draft statutes with more explicit intentions.
The Court's decision in Brogan is consistent with the "new
textualist" movement.3 3 The Court was ripe to reject a doctrine
that had no basis in the statute's "plain meaning."3°4 And the
"exculpatory no" doctrine clearly had no basis in the statutory
language of § 1001.305 In fact, § 1001 was so clear that nontextu-
alist members of the Court3°6 could not easily challenge its
"plain meaning. 0 0 7  Moreover, Justice Scalia's influence has
made the Court "somewhat less willing to refer to legislative his-
tory when the statutory text has a plain meaning."0 8 The deci-
"Id. at 540-41.
Eskridge, supra note 287, at 667-68.
I& at 667.
"0 Mank, supra note 223, at 541 (citing West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83, 112-16 (1991) (StevensJ., dissenting)).
See Eskridge, supra note 287, at 621 (describing the "new textualist" movement
on the Court).
mid.
"'Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808.
Justice Stevens is the most prominent nontextualist, while Chief Justice
Rehnquist and to a lesser extent all otherJustices besides Justices Scalia and Thomas
have also favored nontextualist views. See Merrill, supra note 292, at 364-65.
Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 812 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (agreeing that the unre-
stricted statutory language admitted no exception for "exculpatory no"), 817 (Stev-
ens,J., dissenting) (same).
" Eskridge, supra note 287, at 656.
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sion in Brogan reflects this trend, since the Court deemphasized
the legislative history of § 1001 because its plain meaning was
clear. The majority opinion did not examine the history of §
1001 amendments and recodifications. 309 In fact, the legislative
history was not a decisive factor in Brogan.310
The decision in Brogan may be evidence thatJustice Scalia's
views are gaining support on the Court. After all, Justice Scalia
authored the opinion of the Court,s1 which unabashedly sup-
ported reliance on the statute's "plain meaning."3 12 However,
Brogan was an easy case factually. The contested language in §
1001, "any false statement," was very clear 313 and the legislative
history was not compelling. Although some lower courts found
that Congress intended § 1001 to prohibit the perversion of
governmental functions, s1 4 the statute's history of amendments
showed, if anything, intent to broaden the scope of the stat-
ute. 15 Whether Congress intended to limit the scope of § 1001
• , - 316
was inconclusive. A true victory for Justice Scalia would have
been for the Court to have ignored compelling legislative his-
tory.1 7 So, although Brogan has already been cited in support of
the "primacy of statutory plain language,"31s Brogan should only
be persuasive in factually similar situations.
3 1 9
Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808-09. Cf. id. at 813-14 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
s'0 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 812 (plain language of § 1001 was decisive factor in Court's
holding).
"' Often,Justice Scalia concurs only in the judgment because the majority includes
a review of legislative history. See Mank, supra note 223 at 533.
312 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 812 ("Because the plain language of § 1001 admits of no
exception for an "exculpatory no," we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.").
-' Id at 808.
3l M at 814 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
"s Id. at 812-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (summarizing history of § 1001's
amendments and recodifications); see United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir.
1996), aff'd sub nom. Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998) (finding that "the
long-term trend [of § 1001 amendments] is one of expansion").
-16 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 814 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
317 Textualists, like Justice Scalia, believe that it is improper for judges to analyze
legislative history to any extent, especially when the statute's text has a clear meaning.
See Mank, supra note 223, at 535 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53
(1987)).
-"a See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998)), vacated and reh'g en banc granted (July
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C. CONGRESS LIKELYWILL NOT RESPOND TO BROGAN
As a result of the holding in Brogan, Congress must now de-
cide whether to overrule the Court by codifying the "exculpa-
tory no" doctrine. Since Congress has the sole law making
authority, it may revise a statute to correct the defect that led to
the Court's misinterpretation.3' Although Congress just re-
cently passed legislation amending § 100131 in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard v. United Statess2  Congress
likely will not revise § 1001 again in light of Brogan.
Three years ago, in Hubbard, the Supreme Court held that §
1001 criminalized only false statements made to the executive
branch of government.3s At that time the relevant text prohib-
ited false statements made "in any matter within the jurisdiction
of any department or agency of the United States. 32 4 The Supreme
Court interpreted this same language forty years ago in United
States v. Bramblett, holding that § 1001 covered false statements
made to all three branches of government.3 5s  Although the
Hubbard decision overruled Supreme Court precedent in Bram-
blett, Congress promptly responded by overruling Hubbard.3 16 In
1996, Congress amended § 1001 to reach "the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of
the United States. 327
10, 1998); Carlson v. Feguson, 9 F. Supp. 2d. 654, 657 (S.D.W. Vir. 1998) (citing Bro-
gan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998)).
3'9 Namely, where the statute is unambiguous and does not yield absurd results, the
legislative history is not compelling, and the policy concerns have not materialized in
circuits where the exception is not recognized. See supra Part V.A.
"20 See Christopher E. Dominguez, Note, Congressional Response to Hubbard v. United
States: Restoring the Scope of 18 U.S. C. § 1001 and Codifying the 'judicial Function" Excep-
tion, 46 CAT-. U. L. REV. 523, 523-24 (1997) (citing generally James J. Brudney, Con-
gressional Commentay on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Chatter or Telling Response?, 93
Mwi. L. REv. 1 (1994)).
121 See supra note 7 for the current text of § 1001 as amended by the False State-
ments Accountability Act of 1996.
22 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
323 SeeFeld, supra note 262, at 5.
32' See Dominguez, supra note 320, at 526.
,2' 348 U.S. 503 (1955) overruled by Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754
(1995).
" See Feld, supra note 262, at 5.
,7 False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, § 2, 110 Stat.
3459.
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Several differences in the Hubbard and Brogan decisions
suggest that Congress will not change § 1001 after Brogan. First,
Hubbard overruled forty years of Supreme Court precedent,
while Brogan rejected a doctrine that was not even uniformly
recognized in the circuits that had adopted it. 28 Second, Hub-
bard imposed a limitation on the scope of § 1001, whereas the
holding in Brogan rejected a limitation.?2 Third, unlike Hub-
bard, extrinsic controls were in place to limit the potential for
abuse under Brogan's interpretation of § 1001.30 Although the
adequacy of these controls has been justly challenged, they do
exist.5 ' The Department of Justice has an established policy
against prosecuting "exculpatory nos" under § 1001 and the
Fifth Amendment confers a right to remain silent during inves-
tigations.5 2 Therefore, Congress is not likely to codify a narrow
exception for an "exculpatory no," unless perhaps, after further
investigation, it finds evidence of actual abuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court in Brogan
v. United States properly concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does
not admit an exception for a false statement that constitutes a
mere denial of guilt.53 The Court acted consistently with its re-
cent emphasis on statutory "plain meaning" by refusing to cre-
ate a narrow exception in otherwise unrestricted text.34
Although Congress may never have intended to criminalize a
mere denial of guilt, it did draft a broad statute. Congress may
elect to revise the statute in light of the holding in Brogan,sss but
3" Compare Dominguez, supra note 320, at 526 (discussion of Hubbard strong
precedent) with supra Part Il.C. (discussion of Brogan weak precedent).
"2 Compare Dominguez, supra note 320, at 527-30 (discussion of Hbbard limitation)
with supra Part V.A. (discussion of Brogan limitation rejection).
See supra Part V.A.
"' See supra Part V.A.
"'See supra Part V.A.
"' 118 S. Ct. 805, 812 (1998).
See Harrell, supra note 238, at 128-29.
Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that after the deci-
sion in Brogan, "Congress may advert to the 'exculpatory no' doctrine.").
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it likely will not respond unless, after initiating a thorough in-
vestigation, it finds evidence of actual prosecutorial abuse.
Although the Court rejected the "exculpatory no" doctrine
because the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 did not admit it,
Brogan should not be cited as a full endorsement of textual-
ism. The Court was not forced to chose between "plain mean-
ing" and compelling legislative history. If congressional intent
had been clearer, Brogan may have been decided differently,
notwithstanding the statute's "plain meaning."
Lauren C. Hennessey
See Eskridge, supra note 287, at 621 (defining "new textualism").
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